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Résumé 
À une date aussi récente que 1939, 80 p. 100 
des voyageurs dans les villes canadiennes em-
pruntaient des tramways et cela, malgré l'ap-
parition des autobus comme concurrents, dès 
1915. Cet article étudie les moyens par lesquels 
les tramways électriques canadiens ont résisté 
à la concurrence des autobus. L'auteur sou-
tient qu'un facteur majeur de la survie des 
tramways est l'habileté que démontrait leur 
propriétaire à obtenir le contrôle du développe-
ment des autobus, puis à utiliser par la suite ces 
derniers pour allonger la vie des réseaux ferrés. 
Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le coût 
élevé du renouvellement des voies et la baisse 
du nombre des clients ont favorisé l'investisse-
ment dans les trolleybus ou les autobus plutôt 
que dans la modernisation des réseaux de 
tramways. Cependant, de grands véhicules des-
servant des routes immuables assuraient encore 
du service. Cette approche conservatrice du 
transport de la part des monopoles urbains 
de la traction a assuré en fin de compte le 
triomphe de l'automobile privée en tant que 
moyen de transport dominant des banlieusards. 
Abstract 
As recently as 1939, 80 per cent of transit pas-
sengers in Canada's cities still travelled on 
street railways, and this despite the introduc-
tion of motor buses as competition as early as 
1915. This article examines the ways in which 
Canadian electric railways contained the chal-
lenge from the motor bus. It posits the view 
that a major factor in the survival of street rail-
ways was their owner's success in gaining 
control over motor bus development, then sub-
sequently using the bus to extend the life of the 
rail systems. After World War II, the high cost 
of renewing tracks and declining patronage 
favoured investment in trolly coaches and/or 
motor buses rather than in the modernization 
of the street railway systems. Service was still 
provided, however, by large vehicles operating 
on inflexible routes. This conservative approach 
to transportation on the part of the city traction 
monopolies ultimately ensured the triumph of 
the private automobile as the dominant carrier 
of urban commuters. 
As recently as 1939, 80 per cent of transit pas-
sengers in Canada's cities still travelled on 
street railways, an entire generation after the 
appearance of the first significant motor bus 
competition in 1915.1 Compared to the almost 
immediate disappearance of the horsecar after 
electric traction began competing with it in 
the 1890s, the persistence of street railways in 
the larger Canadian cities into and beyond 
World War II requires some explanation. How-
ever, only for Toronto - the lone Canadian city 
where trams survived into the 1960s - has one 
been offered. It has focussed on what made 
the Toronto system distinctive: its compact-
ness, its high ridership, its avoidance of 
unprofitable suburban routes until the mid 
1950s, its use of interurban routes to cross-
subsidize city service and, more generally, 
the superiority of its management. Oriented 
towards explaining Toronto's uniqueness, this 
research cannot explain, except by inference, 
the persistence of trams elsewhere in Canada.2 
As a first step towards a more general expla-
nation of the tram's survival into the 1940s, this 
article examines the ways in which Canadian 
electric railways contained the challenge from 
the motor bus. It does not offer a complete 
answer to the question of the electric railway's 
persistence; rather it focusses on the role that 
"technological momentum" plays in the per-
sistence of an old technology, which street rail-
ways were in 1915. Its thesis is simple: that a 
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major factor in the survival of Canada's street 
railways after 1915 was their success in gain-
ing control over motor bus development and 
their subsequent use of the bus to extend the 
life of the rail system. 
Technological Momentum 
As the concept of technological momentum 
provides the intellectual framework for this 
piece, it merits brief discussion before pro-
ceeding to the analysis of street railway per-
sistence and motor bus development before 
World War II. The concept derives from the 
work of Thomas P. Hughes on the electrification 
of Western society. He concluded that large 
technological systems "have a characteristic 
analogous to the inertia of motion in the phys-
ical world." They derive this conservative 
momentum, or power of trajectory, from - to use 
John Staudenmeier's terminology - the "main-
tenance constituency" created by the system 
itself as it matures, becoming "embedded in 
the social fabric." This constituency consists, 
Staudenmeier says, of, 
all the individuals, groups, and institutions that 
have come to depend on the design [ofthe tech-
nology] and consequently have adapted to its 
constraints. Because they both profit from and 
depend upon it they maintain its momentum 
in society and become a primary source of its 
power to affect future technological and soci-
etal directions. 
The sources of system persistence include, 
then, not merely the "vested interests, fixed 
assets, and sunk costs" of concern primarily to 
managers ofthe system, but also the adaptations 
made by those served by the system and by 
those, like municipal governments, who have 
based their fiscal and regulatory regimes on a 
presumption of system durability.3 
Self-interest generates momentum. Also 
important, however, are the cultural adapta-
tions, the changes in mentality induced by the 
system. The most important of these, so far as 
street railways were concerned, was the value 
North Americans had come to place on the 
idea ofthe system itself. The "search for order" 
after 1870 had led, as Joel Tarr and others have 
remarked, to rejection by urban elites of the 
"messy decentralized and labor-intensive tech-
nologies of die preindustrial city" in favour of 
the order and control offered by centralized, 
hierarchical, capital-intensive systems. By the 
time the motor bus challenged electric trac-
tion, the economic benefits associated with 
systematization had thoroughly infused North 
American culture with its values and priorities, 
of which the most important for mass transit 
was its emphasis on efficiency as the appro-
priate test for new technologies.4 
The ability of the practitioners of conven-
tional technology to determine what tests a 
new, alternative technology must pass to qual-
ify for societal adoption is also, as Hugh Aitken 
has observed for radio, an important source 
of technological momentum. New systems 
are often "judged to be less efficient than the 
system" they challenge because they are less 
developed, still incomplete, and because the 
"standards of performance by which the new 
system is appraised have been worked out in 
terms of the jobs that the old system has done 
and the criteria especially relevant to those 
jobs." As Edward Constant has pointed out, 
since alternative technologies tend to "... 
exhibit their greatest virtues along different 
dimensions - efficiency versus speed, for exam-
ple," the power of old technologies to dictate 
performance criteria for new ones is a funda-
mental inertial force in any society.5 
The Onset of Buses 
With these basic notions in mind, let us exam-
ine the process by which the technological 
momentum of Canada's street railways empow-
ered them to shape motor bus technology to aid 
their own survival. The analysis begins in 
1914-15 with the onset of significant bus com-
petition. The bus, then commonly known as a 
jitney (a sobriquet derived from west coast 
American slang for a five-cent coin), did not 
generally have the operating characteristics 
later seen as central to motor bus technology. 
First, the jitney was considerably smaller than 
subsequent transit buses; it was typically a 
Ford Model T touring car modified to handle 
between five and twelve passengers. Second, 
it generally operated as a hailed-ride, route 
taxi; in other words, it had neither a set sched-
ule nor fixed stops. About 3800 motor vehicles 
with these characteristics operated as jitneys 
in Canada during the summer of 1915; that 
was one out of every 25 motor vehicles in the 
country.6 
The popularity of the new technology var-
ied considerably from one community to the 
next, but it generally fared best in Vancouver, 
Victoria, Hamilton, London and Toronto, cities 
with a relatively mild climate (jitneys were 
normally open vehicles), paved roads and an 
7 
FlppKcvtp 0r"> PH»L" »r PBLKL Connusone/>s. 
unpopular tram system. The number of jitneys 
also fluctuated with local employment condi-
tions because the owner-operators typically 
came from businesses - the skilled trades or real 
estate sales - that were more lucrative than 
bus-driving in boom times. The western depres-
sion after 1913 thus helps to explain the high 
incidence of jitneys in frigid Winnipeg and 
Edmonton (see Table 1 for the breakdown by 
city).7 
Wherever hard times spurred a hundred or 
more motorists to swarm into the trade, the jit-
ney bus became a dangerous competitor for it 
could then compete with the street railway in 
frequency of service, at least on the principal 
thoroughfares, while operating at speeds 40 to 
50 per cent faster than the 8.5 to 10.5 miles (14 
to 17 kilometres) per hour achieved by most 
urban railways of the era. The fastest speeds 
were achieved by the smallest jitneys since 
the bus, as its carrying capacity grew, became 
more awkward in traffic and prone to longer and 
more frequent stops to take on and to discharge 
passengers.8 
It was the small bus - the modified Ford tour-
ing car - that posed the greatest threat to elec-
trie; traction for it was superior in three ways: 
Table 1: Jitneys, maximum number reported by 
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Although most jitneys 
were owner-operated, 
there were abortive 
attempts to organize 
jitney corporations. 
Promoters of one such 
venture in Toronto 
offered this blueprint to 
show that 12-16 people 
could fit onto a Model T 
Ford chassis. (City oj 
Toronto Archives) 
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the fastest mode of public transit, touring cars 
also offered the shortest headways (the most fre-
quent service) on the routes where they con-
centrated and they could be persuaded to 
deviate a block or two from their routes to give 
commuters something akin to door-to-door ser-
vice. They also permitted commuters to seg-
regate themselves according to class, race, sex 
and tobacco usage.9 And all this for five cents, 
the standard cash fare on Canada's street rail-
ways. It is not surprising, then, that jitneys 
increased the riding habit (rides per capita) in 
the cities in which they flourished by attract-
ing walkers, auto owners and others who had 
avoided the trams.10 
Needless to say, street railway managers did 
not stress the importance of speed, frequency, 
versatility and ridership appeal in their assess-
ment of motor bus technology. Rather, they 
argued that public transit had to be judged in 
terms of its reliability and efficiency. By both 
standards jitneys were substandard: notori-
ously unreliable, their numbers fluctuated 
depending on the day of the week, the season 
and the weather. As open cars, jitneys lost 
much of their appeal on blustery days and so 
stayed home. Muddy roads deterred them while 
a blizzard could keep them off the streets for 
two or more days since street railways typically 
did the only ploughing. They understandably 
took the opportunity to blockade their com-
petition with snow.11 
The Jitney's Economic Inefficiency 
It was not die jitney's unreliability that doomed 
it politically, however, but its inefficiency. As 
Samuel Haber has shown for the United States, 
North Americans worshipped "efficiency" in 
the 1910s; the requirement for any new tech-
nology to be as "efficient" as the one it sought 
to supplant provided the street railway with 
most of its inertial momentum before World 
War II. The test of efficiency was sometimes 
expressed in physical terms - in the amount of 
energy or street space needed to transport a pas-
senger - but usually it focussed on the bot-
tom-line: to warrant survival, jitneys had to be 
as economically efficient as the tram.12 
At first, street railways hoped to prove that 
the jitney was so "flagrant a violation of all 
economic laws" that it could not generate 
sufficient revenue to pay for adequate depre-
ciation and interest on capital. However, their 
own research (much of it published) found 
that jitneying was economically viable over 
the long-haul. The best data came from Van-
couver where B. C. Electric Railway secretly 
operated three Model T Fords as jitneys dur-
ing the winter of 1914-15; after depreciation, 
interest and taxes, these had net revenues of 
$918 a year (prorated, see Table 2 for addi-
tional information), an average manufacturing 
wage.13 
In many cities, the jitney could support an 
owner-operator who worked out of his own 
home, kept his own books, and did his own 
maintenance and cleaning. It could not gener-
ate sufficient revenue to pay for either a second 
driver or the normal overhead costs of a cor-
poration, however. It could not, in other words, 
underwrite the managerial hierarchy neces-
sary to operate it as part of a centralized, co-
ordinated system. Traction managers, there-
fore, had no interest in it; to them it was a 
retrograde technology incompatible, not only 
wiui the persistence of their own rail networks, 
but with "system" itself. The managers were not 
alone, of course, in identifying systematic man-
agement with the corporate form: the well-
publicized failure of jitney corporations in 
several American cities in 1915 convinced 
many North Americans, especially in the media, 
that the technology itself had failed. Certainly 
these bankruptcies and the underlying eco-
nomic marginality of die jitney ensured that the 
investment community had more interest in 
preserving the old technology than in under-
writing the new.14 
The economic inefficiency of the jitney also 
assured the street railways and allied investors 
of the votes they needed to suppress it. A small 
Table 2: Balance Sheet, Traction-operated jitneys, 
Vancouver, 1915 
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bus could subsist on a five-cent fare only by 
limiting its service to the most profitable routes 
and hours, what transit companies called the 
"cream" of the traffic; it could not accept free 
transfers; and it had to charge more than a jit-
ney for any ride of more than 2.5 miles (4 kilo-
metres). That meant the jitney failed yet another 
performance test: the ability to maintain the 
North American tradition of a single, univer-
sal fare for the urban area.15 
Moreover, by drawing off the "cream" of 
the street railways' business, the jitney also 
undermined the railway's ability to continue 
overcharging short-haul riders to subsidize the 
fares of riders from the middle, suburban zone. 
Traction companies constantly iterated that 
they could easily counter the jitney's threat 
by lowering fares within the inner zone from 
which the jitney drew the bulk of its rider-
ship. However, there would then be no surplus 
produced for the "cross-subsidization" of out-
living residents who perforce would have to pay 
the true, marginal cost of their longer journeys. 
Public transit, in other words, would have to 
convert to a zone fare system if bus-rail com-
petition was allowed to continue.16 
Traction companies asserted that Canadi-
ans would not accept zone fares, because these 
would raise the price of long-distance com-
muting, thus impeding the outward movement 
of the population and the attendant emptying 
of inner city slums. This argument had con-
siderable appeal to those groups who benefitted 
most from cross-subsidization: downtown busi-
ness interests, especially retailers, and subur-
ban land developers and property owners. 
Graduated fares would tend to lower the value 
of real estate both in suburbia and in the down-
town core by reducing their mutual accessi-
bility. Although inner city homeowners would 
have benefitted from a reordering of property 
values, they lacked the economic and electoral 
clout of the suburban-downtown alliance. The 
latter also had the moral authority and zeal 
that came from defending existing property 
relations. They had made a good faith invest-
ment, they said, and simple justice demanded 
that government protect it.17 
Much of the inertial momentum of traction 
technology thus came from the unwillingness 
of property holders to permit a rearrangement 
of real estate values. Their concern for future 
property values also caused residents of the 
"streetcar suburbs" to oppose the substitution 
of buses for dieir tram service, even when that 
meant no increase in fares, because they typi-
cally regarded the fixed investment in track 
as their assurance that transit routes were 
reasonably stable and fixed. As automobiles 
spread, property values eventually required 
less of an ironclad guarantee of future transit 
service; even so, a selling point for trackless trol-
leys from the 1920s to the 1940s was the invest-
ment in poles and overhead wire, for this gave 
"a greater impression of permanence" than did 
the mere designation of a motor bus route.18 
Municipal Regulation 
Pressure from downtown businesses and from 
suburban voters pushed municipal politicians 
towards strict regulation, if not suppression, of 
the jitney. Politicians also did not want to see 
the city's tax regime altered. Traction corpora-
tions had proved easy prey to municipal tax col-
lectors: they were unpopular monopolies that 
needed the ongoing co-operation of city coun-
cil to protect their heavy fixed investment in 
rail, overhead and specialized cars. Under con-
stant threat of a municipal takeover, and know-
ing full well that its assets could not easily be 
moved to another locale, the traction corpora-
tion in each city had shared its monopoly 
profits with its host community through a tax 
on gross receipts, a tax on its cars or track, and 
by assuming the cost of paving and clearing 
snow from the streets around its tracks. In 1916 
the tax on its gross earnings cost Vancouver's 
street railway $38 249 in Vancouver alone.19 
Vancouver's jitneys, on the other hand, paid 
only $8100 in taxes that year. There, as else-
where, jitneys could not be compelled to pay 
traction-like taxes, for they had no monopoly 
profits to share. As petty enterprises they did 
not constitute as politically inviting a tax tar-
get as a corporation. Their size also made them 
more expensive to regulate because additional 
license inspectors and traffic constables had to 
be hired. Even if government regulation could 
somehow have fashioned them into a corporate 
monopoly, the resulting firm would have been 
far less susceptible than electric railways to 
municipal pressure and political blackmail 
because most of its fixed assets would have 
consisted of motor vehicles, readily moved to 
a new jurisdiction if the host community 
became more greedy. Unwilling to accept the 
fiscal implications of the demise of the street 
railway monopoly, municipal politicians 
became an important part of its maintenance 
constituency.20 
This line-up of forces would probably have 
been sufficient to ensure protective legislation 
for the street railway. In addition, traction had 
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the support of elite motorists and their auto 
clubs, both anxious to eliminate a competitor 
for road space;21 of trade unionists who stood 
in solidarity with beleaguered street railway 
employees;22 of moral reform leagues con-
cerned about the possibilities of undue famil-
iarity between the sexes in the back seat of a 
jitney;23 and of all those, a socially disparate 
group, who believed that past regulation of the 
trams entailed an implicit contract to preserve 
them (or else who feared retaliation by capital 
markets). 
With so extensive a coalition backing them, 
by mid 1915 street railways in most commu-
nities were able to obtain regulations that, as 
Ross Eckert and George Hilton have observed 
for the United States, imposed 
some special burden on the jitney... designed 
to negate one or more of the several aspects of 
its comparative advantage - that of a rela-
tively speedy, convenient and specialized ser-
vice - by so greatly raising the cost of operation 
that entry into the industry would cease and 
extant jitneys would be left with the choice of 
either unprofitable operation or withdrawal... 
from the industry. 
Politically, it helped the foes of the jitney that 
street railways already faced comparable restric-
tions and that proscription accordingly could 
masquerade as "fairness." That the original 
regulations had been designed to constrain a 
monopoly did not prevent their being applied 
to a competitive situation - clearly a further 
instance of technological momentum working 
in traction's favour.24 
The regulatory ordinances overburdened 
jitney owner-operators by requiring them to 
operate the same hours as the tram company; 
they stripped them of their flexibility by restrict-
ing them to fixed routes and by forbidding 
their use as taxis, delivery cars or sightseeing 
buses during off-peak hours; they reduced their 
revenue potential by imposing limits on their 
passenger capacity and by ordering them away 
from tram routes and busy downtown inter-
sections. Finally, they dramatically raised their 
costs by imposing longer, through routes on 
them and by requiring jitneurs to pay an annual 
tax of $5-$25 per seat to compensate the munic-
ipality for reduced revenue from its street rail-
way taxes. 
Jitneurs were also required to take out an in-
demnity bond of $1000 - $5000 to insure their 
passengers in case of an accident. The bond was 
the most powerful deterrent to jitneying because 
it cost $100 - $250 a year. It was also generally 
difficult to procure because the old-line insur-
ance companies were unwilling to risk their 
money on an untried technology in competi-
tion. with an industry - traction - in which 
they had often invested considerable sums.25 
By the autumn of 1915 these regulations 
had eliminated the bulk of Canada's jitneys; yet 
in early 1918, five Canadian cities still hosted 
between 75 and 300 jitneys each. These did pro-
vide a living (jitney incomes reported in Van-
couver were net earnings, after the payment of 
the bond and license fee) and were not about 
to disappear of their own accord. To eliminate 
these holdouts, between 1918 and 1930, gov-
ernments found it necessary to award street rail-
ways an official monopoly over urban transit. 
The nature of the gift varied from city to city: 
in Toronto, for example, the traction company 
simply received a veto over jitney licenses. 
The usual Canadian practice, however, was 
for the city to sign a franchise agreement with 
the local street railway awarding it a monopoly 
over public transportation in exchange for con-
cessions on fares, routes and service. By 1930 
Canadian street railways had obtained a legal 
monopoly over public transit in every major 
city. In Hamilton, Montreal, Toronto and Van-
couver they also controlled most of the interur-
ban routes entering the city.28 
Had early bus competition been better orga-
nized and more appealing to corporate capital, 
the outcome might have been different. The eco-
nomic marginality and political vulnerability 
of the jitney version of the motor bus, however, 
prolonged the life span of Canadian street rail-
ways by engendering government regulations 
that enabled electric railways to dominate bus 
development in major urban centres. 
The Railway's Dominance 
Electric railways actually used the bus to 
prolong their own existence. They were in 
no hurry to die. First, their managers under-
standably were emotionally committed to trac-
tion and loath to make their own skills obsolete. 
Second, they had no interest in proving that 
buses could handle the main traffic flows, 
because such a demonstration would lessen the 
value of their rail systems, making it more 
difficult to obtain either a fair price in the event 
of a municipal takeover or favourable fares in 
the event of rate-of-return regulation. Third, 
because they had not adequately amortized 
their rail systems, they were determined to 




By the mid 1920s, rail 
companies had begun to 
add buses to their 
service. These buses at 
first were no larger than 
the largest jitneys. 
(City of Ottawa Archives) 
move towards bus conversion would have sad-
dled the transit company with a double burden 
of debt - for the new equipment and for the 
old.27 
Fourth and most important, streetcars had 
lower operating costs than buses well into the 
1920s and perhaps into the 1930s. The indus-
try's own data for 1914-16 indicate that the seat-
mile costs (total costs including interest and 
depreciation divided by the number of seats in 
the vehicle and the number of miles run) of a 
20-22 seat motor bus were at least 28 per cent 
and possibly 68 per cent higher than for the 
average North American streetcar. The gap in 
the United States remained in the 30—37 per 
cent range in 1923-24.2H 
By 1928, however, the gap had vanished in 
Canada according to the calculations of the 
bus committee of the Canadian Electric Railway 
Association. Donald Dewees, a transportation 
historian, has asserted that American streetcars 
retained their cost advantage in 1929 (though 
he provides no evidence for this contention). 
If true, they had lost it by 1936 because James 
St Clair's data reveal that a 33-seat motor bus 
then had a 20 per cent advantage in seat-mile 
costs over a 50-55-seat streetcar. It would 
appear, then, that streetcars and motor buses 
had comparable seat-mile costs by the 1930s.29 
Yet streetcars had a far superior overload 
capacity, hence potential earning power. As of 
1928, a 33-seat motor bus could only accom-
modate seven standees, whereas a 42-seat tram 
could handle as many as 68. Fully overloaded, 
the tram's operating costs per passenger-mile 
were less than half those of the bus. It was, con-
sequently, the appropriate vehicle for rush-
hour duty and transit companies, then as now, 
made their equipment decisions with peak ser-
vice in mind. Although they considered oper-
ating different-sized vehicles at different hours 
to reduce the number of empty seats during the 
off-peak, they calculated that it was too expen-
sive to keep drivers and equipment in reserve 
solely for peak service. To keep their costs 
down at rush hour, especially their wage bill, 
they operated large-capacity vehicles all day; 
to fill some of the empty places during off-
peak hours, they reduced headways (frequency 
of service) to the minimum that custom and law 
permitted. This practice tended to drive away 
transit customers, but it did prolong the life of 
street railways.30 
Deluxe Service and Feeder Routes 
The traction companies considered that the 
motor bus should protect rather than replace 
the street railway. In the 1920s, they agreed on 
the following limited use for buses: to provide 
a deluxe, extra-fare, guaranteed-seating, express 
service between downtown and certain elite res-
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idential districts. Designed to entice the wealthy 
out of their automobiles, extra-fare or deluxe 
buses operated in at least nine Canadian cities 
in the mid 1920s and 1930s. While marginal 
operations were limited to just one or two 
routes in each locale, these extra fare buses 
served the street railways politically by "prov-
ing" that even superior service could not entice 
a sufficient number of automobile owners out 
of their cars. This conclusion made it psycho-
logically easier for both the transit provider 
and the host community to accept a stagnant 
or declining riding habit, thus easing the pres-
sure on transit companies to expand their rid-
ership through more radical innovations such 
as microbuses with frequent headways.31 
Deluxe buses also proved the street rail-
ways' contention that a responsible trans-
portation corporation could not afford to offer 
its riders a jitney-like service for the standard 
transit fare. These extra-fare jitneys for the rich 
barely broke even, thus appearing to substan-
tiate the railways' claim that jitneying was eco-
nomically unsound, of interest only to the 
economically illiterate. 
Only a minority of Canada's street railways 
experimented with deluxe buses; virtually all 
of them, however, made use of so-called feeder 
buses to satisfy the demand for increased ser-
vice in low-density suburban neighbourhoods 
as cheaply as possible. This demand, if unmet, 
was liable to spawn new, independent bus 
companies armed either with a municipal fran-
chise or a certificate of "convenience and neces-
sity" from the provincial government. If these 
independents procured the right to operate an 
interurban service between their home base 
and the central business district of their region, 
then they could do real damage to a street rail-
way, either quasi-legally by situating their 
interurban terminal on the boundary of the 
railway's monopoly zone, or quite illegally by 
having their interurban buses pick up and dis-
charge riders while travelling through that 
zone.32 
Feeder buses were the cheapest method of 
preventing this type of debilitating competition. 
Because the territories in question had small 
populations spread out in single-family 
dwellings, feeder buses typically lost money, 
but considerably less than a new street railway 
would have lost, inasmuch as the latter's cost 
advantage per seat-mile disappeared at low 
traffic densities (the point at which most of 
the seats went unfilled). Feeder buses thus 
reduced the cost of protecting the street rail-
way's monopoly.33 
An added benefit of feeder bus operations 
was their unprofitability. Because most urban 
buses were being used on these money-losing 
routes (often with the express purpose of prov-
ing these to be unviable), it was easy for tran-
sit managers to identify the bus with red ink, 
and thus to remain loyal to the tram. Through-
out the 1920s and 1930s, their trade journals 
and learned papers at conferences assembled 
data from across North America to "prove" 
that the tram had higher net earnings per seat-
mile than the bus, even after its initial cost 
advantage had disappeared. Although the statis-
tics occasionally contained the caveat that 
street railways served more densely populated 
areas with a higher riding habit, they nonethe-
less left the general impression that buses were 
useful for cutting losses and street cars for mak-
ing profits.34 
Feeder buses had one final virtue: they 
reduced the public's enthusiasm for motor 
buses. There is clear evidence that the public 
originally preferred to ride buses, and express 
buses were especially popular with the resi-
dents of outiying districts. Street railways rarely 
provided this type of service before World War 
II because it would lure away passengers 
needed to keep their rail lines solvent. Instead, 
their feeder operations required a transfer to the 
rail system for trips of more than a mile or two 
(1.5-3 kilometres). Commuters - then as now 
preferring a continuous, uninterrupted jour-
ney - usually reacted by demanding rail service, 
the denial of which left them griping about 
the inadequacy of the bus.35 
Bigger, Slower Buses 
The motor bus was, in any case, gradually 
becoming larger and consequentiy less popular. 
By June 1939, the average bus in the four lar-
gest Canadian systems had more than 28 seats, 
four times the seating capacity of a standard jit-
ney.36 More cumbersome in traffic, forced to 
make more frequent and lengthier stops to take 
on and discharge passengers, the larger buses 
were slower buses. By the late 1930s, they had 
lost their speed advantage over trams. At sched-
uled speeds of 10-11 miles (16-18 kilometres) 
per hour, the latter even may have become the 
speedier mode (transportation experts disagree 
on this matter), as they had marginally im-
proved their performance since 1915 despite 
worsened traffic congestion.37 
Street railways, awakened by the jitney to the 
public's latent demand for speedy transit, had 
changed their operating procedures (less coast-
13 
ing, fewer trailers and designated stops) and had 
purchased a new generation of smaller, one-
person cars with improved acceleration, brak-
ing and gates for egress and ingress.38 
Buses, on the other hand, had become slower 
as they had grown more elephantine - jitneys, 
it will be recalled, had scheduled speeds of 
14-15 miles (22-24 kilometres) per hour. 
Slower buses were less popular buses: by the 
late 1930s, some passenger surveys revealed for 
the first time a preference for riding on street-
cars, provided they were of modern design. 
As options altered, the tram's long-term pros-
pects improved.3" 
It was not, of course, out of a perverse desire 
to make buses less popular that street railway 
companies asked bus manufacturers to make 
them bigger. Their behaviour is easily explained 
in terms of the economic theory of regulated 
monopoly. As Harvey Averch and Leland 
Johnson noted in 1962, the sort of "rate-of-
return regulation" that governed transit after the 
suppression of the jitney creates a bias towards 
capital-intensive technology (the Averch-
Johnson effect), since the fares authorized by 
the regulators - hence the utility's profit or 
rate-of-return - depends on the latter's sunk 
costs. Transit monopolies thus had a financial 
incentive to maximize their capital costs and 
to minimize their variable or labour costs, 
hence the decision to run fewer, bigger buses. 
Moreover, as Gabriel Roth and Anthony 
Shephard have observed, as monopolies they 
did not have to "bear the waiting time of [their] 
customers." Researchers have found that entre-
preneurs in more competitive situations (as in 
the early jitney era), have opted for smaller 
buses and more labour-intensive practices.40 
The End of Street Railways 
Canada's transit monopolies in the 1930s set 
as their goal the "street railway-type bus," that 
is, a large one with the operating characteris-
tics (for example, inflexible routes) and cost 
profile of a tram - a streetcar "operating on 
pavements instead of on rails," as one transit 
journal expressed it.41 Once they had obtained 
a "street railway-type bus," the streetcar's days 
were numbered. However, what really ended 
the traction era in Canada was the obsoles-
cence of the continent's track, thanks to the pas-
sage of time and the development of heavier, 
more powerful streetcars. Canada's electric 
Fig. 3 
By 1941. the "street-
railway type" bus had 
been developed: the 
engine moved to the rear 
and seating capacity 
almost doubled. 
(City of Ottawa Archives) 
Fig. 4 
Meanwhile, railways 
had experimented with 
smaller, one-truck 
streetcars of the 
"Burney" type in un 
attempt to give to 
traction the speed and 
loading times being 
gradually taken from the 
motor bus. Thecals, 
however, gave too rough 
a ride to be popular. 
(City of Ottawa Archives) 
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railways had initially laid their track more or 
less simultaneously between 1890 and 1910. 
After it had reached the end of its 40-50 year 
life-span, they pulled it up more or less simul-
taneously to switch to motor bus or trolley 
coach operation.42 
Higher standards and thicker pavements 
(both a response to the automobile) meant that 
any new track would be much more expensive, 
even allowing for inflation, than the track it 
replaced. Because the seat-mile costs of both the 
motor bus and the trolley coach were already 
lower than those of the tram by 1945 (respec-
tively by 14 and 40 per cent, according to James 
St Clair's calculations for the United States), 
concern for the bottom-line decreed rail aban-
donment. To be sure, streetcars retained a supe-
rior revenue potential thanks to their overload 
capacity, but transit executives correctly antic-
ipated a decline in patronage after the war, 
and they were more intent on reducing their risk 
than in expanding their capabilities. The over-
all trend in transit ridership had been down-
ward since the 1920s; it did not make economic 
sense, then, to make an investment in track and 
a new roadbed that would take 40 to 50 years 
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